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Abstract 
The European Commission has launched a study on the applicability of existing chemical industry 
safety provisions to enhancing security of chemical facilities covering the situation in 18 EU Member 
States.  This paper reports some preliminary analytical findings regarding the extent to which existing 
provisions that have been put into existence to advance safety objectives due to synergy effects could be 
expected advance security objectives as well.  
The paper provides a conceptual definition of safety and security and presents a framework of their 
essential components.  Key differences are discussed.  A safety framework is examined with the intent to 
identify security elements potentially covered.  Vice versa, a security framework is examined with the 
intent to identify safety elements potentially covered.  It is concluded that Synergies exist at the 
mitigation level.  At the strategic policy level, synergies are obvious.  Synergies are largely absent at the 
preventive level.    
The security of chemical facilities is important.  First, facilities with large inventories of toxic materials 
could be attractive targets for terrorists.  The concern is sabotage causing an intentional release that 
could endanger neighbouring populated areas.  Second, facilities where high-risk chemicals are present 
could present opportunities for theft.  The concern is that relatively small amounts of highly toxic 
chemicals could be taken to another location selected for higher impact.  
The Directive on European Critical Infrastructures (ECI Directive) addresses facility security but does 
not cover the chemical sector.  Chemical facility safety at EU level is addressed by way of the Seveso-II 
Directive.  Preliminary estimates by the chemical industry suggest that perhaps 80% of the existing 
safety measures under Seveso-II would also be instrumental in terms of raising security.   
This paper finds no support for the idea that such strong synergies exist at chemical facility level. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which existing provisions 
and practices related to enhancing chemical facility safety can be expected to 
serve the dual purpose of also enhancing chemical facility security.   
The context is the growing concern about terrorism which has led to various 
initiatives to counter the threat from terrorists accessing toxic industrial 
materials (TIMs) and misusing these for terrorist attacks.  The Directive on 
European Critical Infrastructures (ECI Directive) addresses facility security but 
does not cover the chemical sector. 
Industries that hold large inventories of TIMs are already subjected to much 
safety legislation in order to control the risks of accidental (unintentional) 
exposure.  Chemical facility safety at EU level is addressed by way of the 
Seveso-II Directive.  Preliminary estimates by the chemical industry 
(IMPROVE 2010) suggest that perhaps 80% of the existing safety measures 
under Seveso-II would also be instrumental in terms of raising security.  
Synergies of this magnitude could have policy implications, implying little 
need for a new security regulatory regime.  An examination of the relationship 
between safety and security is therefore warranted. 
In 2012, the European Commission launched a study on the applicability of 
existing chemical industry safety provisions to enhancing security of chemical 
facilities.  This paper presents some preliminary analytical findings from this 
study.  
1.2 Key differences between safety and security 
The key distinction between safety and security relates to malicious intent.  
Preventive safety precautions relate to the prevention of accidents, i.e. 
prevention of unforeseen and unplanned events with lack of intention or 
necessity.  In contrast, preventive security is the degree of protection against 
danger, damage, loss, and crime.  
Preventive safety analysis techniques aim at identifying vulnerabilities in the 
design and control philosophy of a chemical facility, in particular situations 
where the failure of a single component could lead to an excursion of the 
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design parameters.  The common method to improve safety is by introducing 
redundant components. Mitigation safety analysis aim at limiting the amount of 
material released, for instance the ability to detect a release, close valves and 
isolate flow to the damaged section; or otherwise reducing the consequences of 
a release, for instance activating water curtains to disperse or absorb vapours.   
In contrast, preventive security analysis techniques aim at identifying 
vulnerabilities to an adversary attack, be it vandalism or terrorism.  Security 
measures therefore generally relate to physical protection.  This includes 
safeguarding of an asset from unauthorized access and acts of malevolence, as 
well as surveillance of the site property and security force response capability.  
Generally, the concept “risk” expresses a combination of frequency of an 
unwanted event and the extent of the consequences (Christensen et al. 2003).  
Within the safety domain, risk is usually expressed as 
Safety Risk = Likelihood of accident  ×  Consequence 
In contrast, within the security domain risk is usually expressed as (McIntyre 
2008) 
Security Risk = Threat  ×  Vulnerability  ×  Impact 
The differences are profound.  Within the safety domain, it is a fair assumption 
that failures occur randomly and the likelihood of failures can be estimated 
using statistical methods.  In contrast, within the security domain, likelihood 
estimations present a challenge.  Because of the human element - the fact that 
humans plan, rehearse, learn and modify in order to optimize the attack 
effectiveness - the events are not random and many of the required 
mathematical assumptions cannot be met.  Human behaviour is difficult to 
predict and providing a quantified prediction of human behaviour is an even 
more difficult task (Sandia 2008).  The nub of the problem is the unpredictable 
nature of terrorism and the terrorists’ deliberate efforts to do what is least 
expected -- that is, to defy prediction (Schierow 2006). 
Consequently, this paper argues that while facilities are able undertake a safety 
risk analysis, they are unable to undertake a security risk analysis, for how 
should the facility be able to estimate the likelihood of an adversary attack?  
Information on threats and the capability and determination of adversary groups 
is scarce, the threat situation is dynamic, and the information sits with the 
intelligence agencies.  Facilities can only examine the site specific 
vulnerabilities to adversary attack - a so-called security vulnerability analysis 
(SVA) -- not the risk. 
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2 Defining chemical facility security 
2.1 Security methodologies from the USA 
The USA has produced several guidance documents and codes for facility 
security, which are available in the public domain.  The American Chemistry 
Council introduced a security addendum to the Responsible Care programme 
less than a year after the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center (ACC 2002).  
Later, the American Petroleum Institute issued a security vulnerability 
assessment methodology for the petrochemical industries (API 2004).   The US 
department of homeland security has developed a web-based chemical security 
assessment tool (CSAT) (DHS 2008) and a set of chemical facility anti-
terrorism performance standards (CFATS) (DHS 2009).   
2.2 The German Baseline Protection Concept 
Germany has developed a security concept and methodology known as the 
Baseline Protection Concept (BMI 2006) which aims to provide guidelines for 
infrastructure operators to develop protection measures. The guidelines cover 
the methodology for adopting protection measures and on minimum protection 
requirements.  
A sample checklist is provided to assist private sector operators in completing 
or upgrading their infrastructure protection plans in practice.  Since special 
aspects relating to individual locations and situations cannot be taken into 
account, the disclaimer says, the aspects covered in the checklist must be 
adapted and supplemented according to the specific needs.  
Despite such caveats, the checklist is elaborated to great detail.  Examples are: 
• Are cellar windows equipped with certified security grids corresponding to 
resistance class 5 at least in accordance with DIN 18106?  
• Are windows without bars equipped with intrusion-resistant fittings of at 
least resistance class WK 5, projectile-resistant laminated safety glass (in 
accordance with DIN EN 356, resistance class P 6 A), lockable window 
handles and screwed-on glazing retaining strips? 
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• Do all external doors comply with resistance class WK 5 in accordance 
with DIN ENV 1627? 
However, such concepts developed for critical infrastructures covered by the 
European ECI Directive may present limitations for chemical facilities.  First, 
some EU Member States interpret critical infrastructures in terms of non- 
interruptibility of service, whereas the concern for chemical facilities would be 
protection of neighbour communities from chemical releases.  Second, while 
important, the priority is not only to restrict physical access to large facilities 
(protection) but also to be able to detect if theft has taken place and determine 
what substance has been stolen, in which quantity and subsequently alert law 
enforcement agencies.  The Baseline Protection Concept is silent on this issue.  
The CFATS guidelines specifically address the ability to resolve inventory 
shortages. 
2.3 Chemical facility security elements, defined 
In order to examine possible synergies between safety and security, essential 
security components must be defined.  Two distinct categories of chemical 
facilities can be identified. (1) Facilities where toxic industrial materials are 
present and from which they could be stolen or otherwise obtained.  (2) 
Facilities which because of large inventories and a location in vulnerable 
surroundings could be attractive targets for terrorists. Table 1 presents a non-
exhaustive listing, defining some security components for the two types of 
facilities. 
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Table 1 Selected components of chemical facility security.   
Note: SVA = Security Vulnerability Analysis  
 Category of chemical facility 
Facility  Facilities with toxic industrial 
materials (TIMs)  
Facilities with TIMs  that are targets in 
themselves 
Concern • Theft of TIM, misappropriation 
elsewhere (metro system etc) 
• Attack with destructive force,  
intentional release of TIM 
endangering the nearby 
community 
Perimeter • Fences and gates, access control • Fences and gates, access control 
• Vehicle barriers  
• SVA 
Building • Stored under lock  • Target hardening 
• SVA 
Intrusion  
response 
• (not required) • SVA 
Inventory control 
and response 
• Procedures that identify, 
investigate, and resolve 
shortages  
• Procedures for reporting 
shortages to law enforcement 
agencies 
• SVA 
Cyber 
security 
• (not required) • SVA 
Onsite emergency  
response, release 
reduction, release 
mitigation 
• (not required) • Written plan, rehearsals 
• SVA 
Offsite emergency 
response, crisis 
management,  
• (not required) • Written plan, rehearsals 
• SVA 
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3 Examination of synergies 
3.1 The EU Seveso Directive’s safety provisions 
In response to some major industrial disasters the EU Seveso Directive came 
into existence in 1982 to control the safety of facilities that store or process 
dangerous substances (82/501/EEC).  The main requirements of the Directive 
relate to prevention and mitigation.  First, the facilities must engage in 
industrial accident prevention work, systematically identifying and assessing 
hazards and taking the necessary safety precautions.  Second, steps shall be 
taken to limit the consequences of an accident, should it occur despite the 
precautions taken, for instance invoking emergency plans to limit the release or 
activating a pre-planned emergency response.   
3.2 OECD guidelines  
In 2003, OECD issued the second edition of its guiding principles for chemical 
accident prevention, preparedness and response.  The aim is to set out general 
guidance for the safe planning and operation of facilities, to prevent accidents 
and, to mitigate adverse effects through effective emergency preparedness, 
land-use planning, and accident response1. 
3.3 Security elements potentially covered by chemical 
facility safety provisions 
Selected safety elements from Seveso II and OECD are presented in Table 2 
below.  Each element is annotated with an interpretation of the typical scope of 
the safety provision and an assessment of how it could serve the dual purpose 
of also addressing security.   
  
                                                   
1  The 2003 OECD guideline covers some security elements, the subject was given addi-
tional attention in a 2011 addendum 
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Table 2 Examination of security elements covered in some safety provisions  
Safety provisions Interpretation of typical scope Assessment of security 
elements (potentially) 
covered 
Safety policy  A Seveso II requirement.  Example elements are: To 
prevent accidents and provide adequate control of 
risks; to provide adequate training; to engage and 
consult with employees, etc 
The policy concerns 
prevention of accidental 
(unintentional) events. 
 
Security elements not 
covered 
Safety Strategy and 
Control Framework 
Typical control elements comprise: formal 
management of change not to introduce errors into a 
good design; a formal permit to work system (PtW) 
to coordinate and manage staff; a mechanical 
integrity program (e.g. corrosion monitoring); etc 
Concerns prevention of 
accidental (unintentional) 
events. 
 
Security elements not 
covered 
Safety management 
systems  
A Seveso II requirement.  Safety management 
systems will often employ a Deming Circle (plan-do-
check-act) to define and implement the control 
framework. 
Security elements not 
covered 
Hazard Identification and 
Risk Assessment 
A Seveso II requirement.  The purpose of a hazard 
identification is to list potential release concerns 
A hazard identification step 
is the starting point for a list 
of possible targets -- 
overlap with security  
Risk assessment employ frequency analysis, 
assuming random failures of components 
Security elements not 
covered 
Inspections, audits, 
reviews 
Typical inspections deal with workplace tidiness, 
corrosions monitoring,  
Security elements not 
covered 
Typical audits relate to adherence to work to permit 
procedures, if preventive systematic risk reviews 
have been carried out,  
Security elements not 
covered 
Typical technical reviews relate to overpressure 
protection, liquid slugs, adequacy of blow down 
facilities 
Security elements not 
covered 
Maintenance and repairs 
(incl. screening of 
personnel) 
Safe maintenance is managed by work permit 
systems and efficient de-energizing of systems prior 
to starting the work  
Security elements not 
covered 
Safe repairs are managed according to procedure, 
using certified welders, controlled annealing of HAZ 
zones, reassembling and fastening equipment 
according to procedure and specification, carried out 
by competent personnel 
Security elements not 
covered 
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Safety provisions Interpretation of typical scope Assessment of security 
elements (potentially) 
covered 
Design, layout, 
construction of facilities 
Safe design is according to standards and good 
engineering practice; with redundant preventive risk 
controls 
Security elements not 
covered 
Safe layout traditionally aims to prevent accident 
escalation 
Overlap with security is 
possible (if it leads to 
reduced vulnerability to 
intentional acts) 
Safe construction is weld management and control 
of construction materials 
Security elements not 
covered 
Land-use Planning A Seveso II requirement.  Good land use planning 
keeps population away from hazardous installations 
Very clear overlap with 
security 
Procedures, personnel, 
internal communication, 
education and training, 
human factors 
Competent personnel may spot mishaps at an early 
stage and stop an accident in its tracks 
Security elements not 
covered 
Competent personnel may in some cases mitigate 
the effects of an intentional act of vandalism 
Overlap with security is 
possible (emergency 
preparedness) 
Emergency preparedness 
and planning 
A Seveso II requirement.  Emergency preparedness 
aims to mitigate the effects of a release, regardless 
if it is intentional or accidental 
Very clear overlap with 
security 
Communication with and 
information to the Public 
A Seveso II requirement.  General knowledge 
enables citizens to take adequate protective 
measures in case of a toxic release  
Very clear overlap with 
security 
Incident reporting and 
analysis 
A Seveso II requirement.  Reporting criteria are 
based on damage,  however, only “accidents” are 
reportable 
Security incidents probably 
not reportable -- depends 
on interpretation if terror 
act is an “accident”  
Contractor evaluation, 
selection, training and 
control 
Safe contractor management aim to have competent 
hired-in personnel that knows procedures for alarm 
initiation and evacuation 
Security elements not 
covered 
 
 
3.4 Safety elements potentially covered in a chemical 
facility security framework 
The checklist in the German Baseline Protection Concept offers an opportunity 
to examine the extent to which safety elements are covered in a security 
framework.  While the perspective is slightly different, if security measures 
enhance safety, not if safety measures enhance security, the results of this 
analysis are instructive.   
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Each security checklist item was simply categorized as potentially benefitting 
or not benefitting safety.  Results are shown in Table 3.  Slightly more than one 
out of four items would have the dual effect of also enhancing safety.  The 
synergies are mainly within emergency planning, organization and risk 
management.  Some checklist items covered protection against natural 
phenomena (e.g. flooding), they were counted as synergies 
It is noteworthy that negative synergies were identified.  They relate to 
restriction of information, either information on where the toxic material is 
located at the facility (warning placards), which is a mandatory requirement in 
most countries, or restriction of information to the public, which is contrary to 
several right-to-know initiatives.  The security concern is that the information 
could be useful to terrorists. 
 
Table 3 Examination of safety elements covered in the German security concept, 
(Baseline Protection Concept)  
Checklist category Number of 
checklist 
items 
Synergy Negative 
synergy 
Unclear 
1. Protection of facilities and 
installations 
69  7 1 1 
2. Personnel  9  0 0 0 
3. Organisation 30 10 1 3 
4. Risk management  9  6 0 3 
5. Emergency planning and 
contingency planning 
14 13 0 0 
Total 131 36 2 7 
Percent 100% 27% 2% 5% 
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4 Mapping safety-security overlaps 
Barrier diagrams are useful for a broad initial mapping exercise of overlaps 
between the safety and the security domain.  A barrier diagram in its most basic 
form is shown in Figure 1.   
 
Figure 1 A basic barrier diagram showing causes and consequences of a toxic 
release from a high risk chemical facility and measures related to 
prevention and mitigation  
 
Figure 2 shows a barrier diagram that has been modified to reflect concerns 
from the effect of random equipment breakdowns and human error (safety) and 
concerns from human intent on causing damage and harm (security).  The 
illustration of preventive barriers for safety condenses the analysis in Table 2, 
which emphasizes that safety is achieved through systematic application of 
redundancy, mechanical integrity and programmatic practices related to the 
execution fo the work.  In contrast, the preventive barriers related to security 
relate to physical protection and access restrictions.  While the exposition is 
simplified is serves to show that synergies are largely absent at the preventive 
level.   
At the mitigation level synergies are obvious, the value of emergency response 
efforts and the general knowledge of the public to take adequate protective 
measures in case of a toxic release are beneficial both for accidental and 
intentional releases of toxic chemicals. 
preventive mitigation
measures measures
Toxic release
loss of containment 
(LOC) 
Causes Consequences
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Figure 2 Barrier diagram shows that barriers related to prevention are different 
for the safety and the security domains, while barriers related to 
mitigation are largely the same.  Prevention measures at the strategic 
level are equally beneficial for both safety and security. Green boxes 
mark synergies. 
 
At the strategic level, synergies are obvious:   
• Chemical safety: Eliminate, substitute:  A general chemical safety strategy 
aimed at elimination of dangerous chemicals, or the substitution to less 
dangerous chemicals.  This equally benefits security, see e.g. Orum (2008) 
for an excellent exposition of this topic. 
• Process safety: Inherently safer design:  A general chemical process 
design safety strategy advocated e.g. by Kletz (1984), simplify, reduce 
inventories, attenuate process conditions (pressure, temperature etc) to 
lower the hazard. 
• Vulnerability: Land-use planning: A general strategy to ensure that 
facilities with major hazard potential are located at distance from the 
general population to minimize the offsite consequences (impact) of an 
uncontrolled event. 
The Venn diagram in Figure 3 maps synergies from a legislation perspective.   
The three domains presented are  (1) chemical facility security legislation, (2) 
major accident hazard legislation (Seveso II) and (3) chemical workplace safety 
legislation.  The Venn diagram illustrates that the hazard mapping activity is 
common for both the safety and the security domain, a clear synergy.  Measures 
to protect unsuspecting individuals from accidental exposure to workplace 
chemicals (keep under lock) benefit both safety and security, also a clear 
synergy. 
POLICY LEVEL PREVENTION measures MITIGATION measures
Strategic measures
(safety) risk analysis
redundancy: technical, organizational
defences-in-depth
mechanical integrity programme
permit-to-work system
management of change onsite emergency response (limit release)
Chemical safety: Safety public aware of danger and countermeasures
Eliminate, substitute offsite emergency response, evacuation (limit exposure)
to less toxic chemical
Process safety:
inherently safer
design, attenuate Security
process conditions, 
reduce inventories
[ onsite emergency response (limit release) - effective?]
Vulnerability: public aware of danger and countermeasures
Land use planning (security) vulnerability analysis offsite emergency response, evacuation (limit exposure)
restrict unauthorized access
perimeter control
deter, detect, delay Business continuity
intrusion reponse (deny)
target hardening
Toxic release
loss of containment 
(LOC) 
Consequences
Equipment
malfunction, 
human error
Malicious
intent
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Figure 3 Mapping overlaps between elements within the domains of chemical 
facility security provisions, major accident hazard provisions (Seveso 
II) and chemical workplace safety provisions 
 
 
Figure 3 also illustrates that there are relatively few overlaps between the safety 
and the security domain.  Important security elements are left unaddressed in 
safety legislation and, vice versa, important safety elements not covered in the 
security domain. 
 
  safety policy, plan
safety control framework (MOC, PTW) security policy, plan
  safety risk assessment     Hazard resolve inventory shortages
  identification reporting of theft
contractor management
(evaluation, training, control) Emergency physical protection, access restrictions
plans security vulnerability analysis (SVA)
workplace inspections, (security risk assessment)
audits, technical reviews LUP
vetting of employee, contractor
community right-to-know cyber
  Keep under lock
MOC - management of change    Workplace assessment
PTW - permit to work system
LUP - land use planning employee training, instruction, knowledge
personal protective equipment
employee consultations
  clear marking of hazards
Major accident hazard legislation
(scope: unintentional events)
Chemical facility security legislation 
(scope: intentional malevolance)
Chemical workplace safety legislation 
(scope: worker protection)
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5 Concluding remarks 
A complex relation exists between the chemical facility safety and security 
domain.  Within some areas there are evident overlaps, or synergies, with the 
two domains supporting each other.  Within a few areas, priorities are 
incompatible, leading to conflict.  Most of the time, there is limited or no 
overlap between the two. 
The strongest synergies exist at the strategic level.  The general chemical safety 
strategy aimed at elimination of dangerous chemicals, or the substitution to less 
dangerous chemicals equally benefits security.  Inherently safer design 
strategies (simplify, reduce inventories) also clearly benefit security.  
Vulnerability reduction strategies by means of land-use planning to keep 
communities away from hazardous installations similarly present strong 
synergies.  
Regarding preventive measures at chemical facility level, overlaps are minimal.  
Preventive safety is achieved through systematic application of redundancy, 
mechanical integrity and programmatic practices related to the safe execution 
of work.  In contrast, preventive security relates to physical protection and 
access restrictions.  
It is noteworthy that negative synergies were identified.  They relate to 
restriction of information: Either information (warning placards) on where the 
toxic material is located at the facility, which is a mandatory requirement in 
most countries to warn unsuspecting workers; or restriction of information to 
the public, which is contrary to several right-to-know initiatives, to support 
local democracy.  The safety objective is that facility knowledge enables 
citizens to take adequate protective measures in case of a toxic release.  The 
security concern is that facility knowledge could be useful to terrorist. 
Major synergies exist at the mitigation level, in particular concerning effective 
emergency response.  The relation is complex however.  Within the safety 
domain, only consequences of "credible worst-case" scenarios may have been 
considered in emergency planning efforts.  This may be perfectly defensible 
from a safety risk point of view if abundant redundant safety measures make 
the likelihood of a severe accidental scenario negligible.  The safety reasoning, 
however, ignores the situation with a determined and capable adversary 
attacker -- the security risk may therefore be much different.   
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It is important that these issues are identified, that benefits from synergies are 
supported, that negative synergies are resolved, with the overall policy 
objective to ensure safe and secure chemical facilities. 
 
Do provisions to advance chemical facility safety also advance chemical facility security? - An analysis of possible synergies 
C:\Users\fhhe\Documents\Artikler\2 - old\2012 Tarnow\Final\Hedlund Tarnow Safety-security-rev1 (final)-kolo.docx 
17 
.  
6 References 
ACC (2002)  Implementation Guide for Responsible Care®.  Security Code of 
Management Practices Site Security & Verification. American Chemistry 
Council. July 2002 
API (2004) Security Vulnerability Assessment Methodology for the Petroleum 
and Petrochemical Industries, Second Edition, October 2004. American 
Petroleum Institute (API) 
BMI (2006)  Protection of Critical Infrastructures – Baseline Protection 
Concept. Recommendation for Companies.  March 2006. The German Federal 
Ministry of the Interior 
Christensen FM, Andersen O, Duijm NJ, Harremoës P (2003) Risk terminology 
- a platform for common understanding and better communication. Journal of 
Hazardous Materials A103:181–203 (2003) 
DHS (2008) CSAT Security Vulnerability Assessment. Questions. US 
Department of Homeland Security. June 2008 Version 1.0 
DHS (2009) Risk-Based Performance Standards Guidance Chemical Facility 
Anti-Terrorism Standards.  US Department of Homeland Security. May 2009 
IMPROVE (2010)  Report of the CBRN Task Force from 13 January 2009, 
citing projects IMPROVE (JLS/2008/CIPS/011, Improve knowledge of 
effective critical infrastructure protection and facilitate exchange of experiences 
and best practices) and SECURE-SITE (EPCIP-2006/30-CE-0087857/00-07, 
Evaluation and improvement of security measures in industrial installations).  
Kletz TA (1984) Cheaper, safer plants.  Or wealth and safety at work.  Notes 
on inherently safer and simpler plants.  Institution of Chemical Engineers 
(IChemE), UK. ISBN 0-85295-167-1 
McIntyre A (2008)  Renewable Systems Interconnection Study: Cyber Security 
Analysis. SAND2008-0947P Sandia National Laboratories, USA  
Orum P (2008) Chemical Security 101. What You Don’t Have Can’t Leak, or 
Be Blown Up by Terrorists Center for American Progress.  November 2008 
Do provisions to advance chemical facility safety also advance chemical facility security? - An analysis of possible synergies 
C:\Users\fhhe\Documents\Artikler\2 - old\2012 Tarnow\Final\Hedlund Tarnow Safety-security-rev1 (final)-kolo.docx 
18 
.  
Sandia (2008) A Risk Assessment Methodology (RAM) for Physical Security. 
Sandia National Laboratories, USA 
(http://www.sandia.gov/ram/RAM%20White%20Paper.pdf , retrieved 30 
January 2012) 
Schierow L-J (2006) CRS Report for Congress. Chemical Facility Security. 
Congressional Research Service. The Library of Congress. (USA) Report dated 
August 2, 2006 
